You think that it is being critical of Bill Ford to say that he is more
Franklin Delano Roosevelt than Teddy Roosevelt? Your credibility went the
moment you wrote that sentence.
Grover C. McCoury III > wrote in message
...
> By Daniel Gross for Slate
> 4/14/05
>
> Last week, Ford Motor Co. showed all the signs of a once-great company in
> distress: a sharply reduced earnings forecast, a credit-rating cut, and a
> sliding stock. Ford has been here before, most recently in early 2003. The
> latest run of bad news may represent either the next stage in a long
decline
> or the point at which a miraculous comeback begins. Regardless, it has
ended
> the hopes that CEO William Clay Ford Jr., the youthful great-grandson of
> Henry Ford, would quickly restore the nation's second-largest automaker to
> its former glory.
>
> Bill Ford, the first recognizable personality at the top of an American
car
> company since former Chrysler head Lee Iacocca, is a hybrid executive, a
> postmodern synthesis. Although he came to the CEO's post in the fall of
2001
> with no great accomplishments, his lineage and his élan gave him instant
> credibility. A humanist among gearheads-Ford is a self-confessed
> guitar-strumming tree-hugger, though he also professes a deep affection
for
> muscle cars-he promised to build an intellectual and managerial bridge
> between Ford Motor Co.'s glorious 20th century and its uncertain 21st.
> "There is an air of nonchalant enthusiasm about Bill Jr., a man clearly
> comfortable in his own skin," Douglas Brinkley wrote in the definitive
> Wheels for the World. But while the miserable run of numbers is obscuring
> some of the genuine good Ford has done, it seems like the bridge is
> buckling.
>
> Henry Ford pronounced history bunk. Bill Ford wallowed in it. Born in
1957,
> he grew up in exclusive Grosse Pointe, prepped at Hotchkiss, and enrolled
at
> Princeton. From an early age, Bill had "an intense infatuation with
American
> history, particularly Abraham Lincoln, Thomas Edison, the Plains Indians,
> and his own ancestor, Henry Ford," as Douglas Brinkley put it. Bill worked
> one summer at Greenfield Village, his great-grandfather's nostalgic
> reproduction of a pre-automobile America. At Princeton, he wrote a thesis
on
> Henry Ford's labor policies.
>
> When Bill went to work at Ford after graduating in 1979, the company was
> both a supercharged global corporation and a fourth-generation family
> business. Henry Ford's descendants controlled the company through a class
of
> special voting stock, and the presumption was that the males among them
> would find their way to the top. Bill rotated through different
departments
> and joined the board of directors in 1988. But when it came to executive
> ability, he was more like the young Franklin Delano than like Theodore
> Roosevelt. According to Brinkley, his boss, Don Peterson, thought him "the
> most likely fourth-generation Ford to rise to the top" but not because he
> had "any remarkable skill." "What he had was a fine manner," Peterson
> explained. "He never became fully knowledgeable of any particular aspect
of
> the company. But he was naturally bright and that can compensate for a
lot."
>
> In January 1999, Bill Ford was named chairman of the board at the age of
41.
> And while Jacques Nasser ran the company as CEO, Ford engaged in
big-think.
> Other American car manufacturers planted new facilities in low-cost
foreign
> countries; Bill Ford advocated investing in domestic manufacturing. His
> signature project involved investing $2 billion to turn his company's vast
> River Rouge complex outside Detroit into a technological and environmental
> showcase. As his competitors feverishly opposed any efforts to boost fuel
> efficiency, Ford proclaimed in 2000 that he could increase the fuel
> efficiency of his company's SUVs by 25 percent in five years. The next
year
> he unveiled the design for the Escape Hybrid SUV, billed as the car that
> would occupy a happy middle ground between the new Japanese hybrid
putt-putt
> and the masculine Hummer.
>
> At the same time, however, Ford Motor Co. continued to stamp out hundreds
of
> thousands of gas-loving Expeditions, Explorers, and Lincoln Navigators.
> Sales of these land yachts boosted Ford's top line, but the bottom line
> suffered. Distracted by investments in technology and services, and intent
> on maintaining too many brands, the company was caught short by the
> 2000-2001 downturn; it lost $5.5 billion in 2001, and Nasser resigned that
> October.
>
> Assuming the role of CEO, Bill Ford made a series of tough decisions. In
> 2002, he pushed through a major restructuring, eliminating 35,000 jobs,
five
> plants, and the Lincoln Continental. Spurred by ultra-low interest rates
and
> 0 percent financing, Ford Motor Co. recovered quickly. Results improved
> markedly in both 2003 and 2004. Future strategy rested on relentlessly
> seeking efficiencies and pumping up the volume of key products, pickup
> trucks and SUVs. Pretax profits would rise to $7 billion by 2006, Bill
Ford
> promised. These profits would enable the company to make the investments
> needed to transform it.
>
> But then Ford the company's drive for profits ran right over Ford the
> humanist's eco-friendly vision. Bill Ford's promise to boost fuel
standards
> for SUVs was abandoned in 2003 as too costly and impractical. Meanwhile,
the
> Escape Hybrid remained trapped on the drawing board until last fall, even
as
> the Toyota Prius became a status symbol. Environmentalists turned on Ford,
> somewhat unfairly. The River Rouge plant, which was opened to the public
in
> May 2004, is an environmental showcase. And this is a guy whose "distaste
> for nonbiodegradable materials" is so powerful that the curtain and
> carpeting in his office "are all made of hemp," as Brinkley noted. Still,
> Ford's image continued to take a beating, especially after it was revealed
> he had been allocated 400,000 shares of Goldman Sachs in a 1999 IPO. Ford
> was a major Goldman Sachs client, and Goldman president John Thornton sat
on
> Ford's board. Ford's own board absolved him of wrongdoing, but he sold the
> shares and gave the profits to charity nonetheless.
>
> Ford Motor Co. turned around enough to have a good year in 2004. But its
> profits came mostly from its financing arm. And there were signs of
trouble.
> In the 2004 fourth quarter, vehicle sales fell far, and Ford's U.S. auto
> operations lost $470 million. And in recent months Ford and General Motors
> have been getting the tar kicked out of them by Toyota, Honda, and other
> companies that specialize in smaller, more fuel-efficient cars. Aside from
> the F-150 truck, Ford lacks big hits. As this March report shows, in the
> first quarter of 2005, sales of the Excursion, Explorer, Expedition, and
> Navigator-the big vehicles that sport far higher profit margins than the
> Taurus-have all declined sharply.
>
> The environmentally friendly products that Bill Ford said would be
integral
> to the company's future also now seem peripheral at best. But it's one
thing
> to overpromise and underdeliver to the Sierra Club and quite another to do
> the same to Wall Street. In April, just one month after reaffirming its
> profit projections, Ford reduced its estimate for 2005 by nearly 30
percent
> and rescinded the promise of $7 billion in pre-tax profits for 2006. The
> market responded by driving Ford's stock down to $10. And last Friday,
> Standard & Poor's lowered Ford's credit ratings-it has $173 billion in
debt
> outstanding-perilously close to the dreaded junk level.
>
> To be sure, this is a very difficult time, perhaps an impossible one, to
be
> the chief executive of an American auto business. The factors that are
> making it difficult to turn a profit-expensive steel and oil, a weak
dollar,
> rising health-care costs, aggressive foreign companies-are likely to be
with
> us for awhile. And the government certainly isn't in any mood to help. But
> Bill Ford no longer appears to be what the Ford family and the company's
> 324,000 employees needs. His job isn't in jeopardy, since his family still
> controls the company. Ford Motor Co. might be best served, however, by a
> sharp break from the past. It needs someone to bust things up, to make
> difficult choices about its many brands, about its relationship with
labor,
> about the basic nature of its business. In short, it needs an executive
who
> more closely resembles relentless Henry than sensitive Bill.
>
> Yet another $.02 worth from a proud owner of a 2001 Ford Ranger 4x4 and a
> 1970 Mach 1 351C @ http://community.webshots.com/album/18644819fHAehGJAjt
>
>
>